VOTING RIGHTS AND THE HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
RACISM: CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA
Brock A. Johnson*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 403

II.

BACKGROUND [U.S.] ...................................................................... 412
A. The Changing Face and Form of Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States ........................ 412
1. Criminal Disenfranchisement Prior to the Civil War ....... 414
2. In the Aftermath of the Civil War: Reconstruction and
the Introduction of Race in Laws of Criminal
Disenfranchisement ........................................................... 415
3. The Current State of Felon Disenfranchisement in the
United States...................................................................... 418
4. The Unique Nature of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
in the United States............................................................ 420
B. The Disparate Racial Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement
Laws in the United States ......................................................... 423
C. Efforts to Challenge Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in
the United States ...................................................................... 424
1. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges .................................. 424
2. Previous Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement
under the Voting Rights Act ............................................... 427
3. The Ninth Circuit Changes the Game (And Then
Changes Its Mind) ............................................................. 430

III.

BACKGROUND [SOUTH AFRICA] .................................................... 433
A. History, Content, and Structure of the South African
Constitution .............................................................................. 433
B. The Constitutional Court of South Africa ................................ 437

*

J.D., University of Georgia, 2016; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
2010. I would like to thank my family for their continued support; I am particularly grateful
for my grandfather’s persistent and longstanding encouragement.

401

402

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:401

C. Transformative Constitutionalism............................................ 438
D. Criminal Franchise in South Africa: August and NICRO....... 439
IV.

ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 444
A. A Shared History of Racial Discrimination ............................. 444
B. Transformative Constitutionalism, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Weight and Influence of
History...................................................................................... 446
C. A New Vision of Felon Disenfranchisement Reform in the
Federal Courts of the United States ......................................... 448

V.

CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 450

2016]

VOTING RIGHTS

403

I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, 5.85 million people were disenfranchised because of
felony convictions as of 2010.1 No other democratic country in the world
disenfranchises more people, in both total numbers and population
percentage, because of criminal convictions.2 Unlike countless other voting
restrictions and regulations contested in the courts,3 felon disenfranchisement
laws have long been a constitutionally viable method of limiting suffrage in
the United States.4 Further, discussion of felon disenfranchisement—until
recently—has escaped thorough debate.5 Yet, despite the long history of
criminal disenfranchisement in the United States, and the possible value such
laws provide to the democratic process, any category of law that restricts
suffrage to such a significant extent should be subject to heightened judicial
review and vigorously debated.
Like most voting regulations in the United States, felon
disenfranchisement provisions are made at the state level.6 Two states,
Maine and Vermont, allow individuals to vote while they are in prison,
placing virtually no regulation on suffrage relative to criminal convictions.7

1
JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 1
(2015), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fdFelony%20Disenfranchis
ement%20Primer.pdf.
2 See LALEH ISPAHANI, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD:
AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 33
(2006), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/assed_upload_fil
e25_25663.pdf (“Disenfranchisement of people with criminal convictions is not the
democratic norm.”).
3 See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding all states are prohibited
from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards, practices,
or procedures which result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote of any citizen who
is a member of a protected class); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668
(1966) (holding a poll tax was “invidious discrimination” that violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583, 586 (1964)
(affirming the district court’s decision to invalidate existing and proposed plans for the
apportionment of Alabama’s bicameral legislature because the plans violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
4
CHUNG, supra note 1, at 1.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
6 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 2–3.
7 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, SARAH SHANNON & JEFF MANZA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2010
(2012), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/State-Lev
el-Estimates-of-Felon-Disenfranchisement-in-the-United-States-2010.pdf.
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In the United States, these states are outliers.8 The majority of states place
voting restrictions on individuals who are not incarcerated but continue to be
under state supervision through probation or parole.9 A significant minority
of states continue to restrict voting rights after an individual has completely
served his sentence;10 a subset of these states prohibit access to the ballot
indefinitely for individuals convicted of a felony.11
Although voting regulations continue to be firmly within the competence
of state governments, significant and unprecedented federal oversight of such
regulations became a unique hallmark of modern voting laws beginning in
the Civil Rights Era.12 Significantly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Supreme Court’s changing view of constitutional protections resulted in
numerous federally required changes to state election law in the latter half of
the twentieth century.13 Central to such new federal regulation was the
notion of the necessity to protect voting rights for marginalized minorities,
particularly African-Americans, who had previously been subject to
discriminatory treatment under the election laws of many states.14
Like many facially neutral state election regulations invalidated by the
Voting Rights Act, felon disenfranchisement laws share the quality of
disproportionately affecting minority populations in the United States.15 This
is an unavoidable consequence of the current American criminal justice
system, a system that continues to disproportionately convict and incarcerate
racial minorities.16 For a myriad of reasons—from practical realties of how
8

Id. at 3 tbl.1.
Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. (listing Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming
as states that disenfranchise all convicted felons and do not have waiting periods).
12 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.
gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws.
13 See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding the plaintiff’s claim of
gerrymandering fell under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Allen
v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (holding state election laws are subject to the
approval requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
14 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 12.
15 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 7, at 10–11.
16
See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 8 (2014),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.
Almost 3% of black male U.S. residents of all ages were imprisoned on
December 31, 2013 (2,805 inmates per 100,000 black male U.S. residents),
compared to 1% of Hispanic males (1,134 per 100,000) and 0.5% of white
males (466 per 100,000). . . . Black males had higher imprisonment rates
across all age groups than all other races and Hispanic males. In the age
9
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local police departments target crime to systemic failures of due process such
as the misuse of preemptory strikes in jury selection and a currently
overstrained right to effective assistance of counsel—the American criminal
justice system convicts and incarcerates a greater relative portion of AfricanAmericans than any other subset of the population.17 Thus, this group is
most acutely impacted by felon disenfranchisement. Whether this should be
accepted by a nation with a living memory of state mandated differential
treatment of minority populations, considering further the implications and
context of such treatment, is a matter deserving of significant political
debate.
Although the Civil Rights movement in the United States launched
changes and reforms in race relations that continue to this day, no democratic
country has confronted the effects of the differential treatment of citizens
based on race and group status in the modern era like South Africa. When
the death knell of Apartheid was finally heard, South Africa became a nation
reborn.18 Political leaders in South Africa enacted an entirely new
constitutional regime, premised primarily on the need to end the historic
oppression of minorities and to construct a new democracy free of the
discrimination central to the Apartheid government.19 This process required
nothing short of near total re-invention. The modern reimagining and
reconstruction of the democratic ideal seen in the South African
Constitution—and subsequent interpretive jurisprudence—presents a
powerful point of comparison to the aging Western model, itself subject to
the unfortunate warts and bruises of history.

Id.

17

range with the highest imprisonment rates for males (ages 25 to 39), black
males were imprisoned at rates at least 2.5 times greater than Hispanic males
and 6 times greater than white males. For males ages 18 to 19—the age
range with the greatest difference in imprisonment rates between whites and
blacks—black males (1,092 inmates per 100,000 black males) were more
than 9 times more likely to be imprisoned than white males (115 inmates per
100,000 white males).

Id.
The End of Apartheid, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/
pcw/98678.htm.
19 MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
UNITED STATES 29–30 (2009).
18
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In April 1994, South Africa held universally free, open democratic
elections for the first time since the rise of Apartheid.20 It was the first
election in the country’s history in which all races could freely participate.21
The presidential candidate elected, Nelson Mandela, had been released from
prison only four years earlier, after being incarcerated for twenty-seven years
and stripped of his fundamental rights, including his right to vote, by the then
reigning Apartheid regime.22 This powerful symbol was not lost on the new
South African government. In the wake of Apartheid, the South African
government tackled its history of racial oppression by drafting a new,
transformative, non-discriminatory constitution to govern their republic.23
Brought into law in 1996, the Constitution of South Africa protects an
impressively expansive array of political and social rights;24 it is now
considered a high-water mark among democratic constitutions throughout
the world.25
Section 19(3) of the Constitution of South Africa provides that “every
adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any legislative body
established in terms of the Constitution.”26 This bedrock of universal
suffrage has allowed the South African Constitutional Court to consistently
protect access to the ballot. Two landmark Constitutional Court cases
involving prisoners’ right to vote have given further support to the strength
of universal suffrage.27 In August v. Electoral Commission, the South
African Constitutional Court wrote:

20

See HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA
176 (1998) (describing the elections that took place between April 27–29, 1994 as “peaceful,”
“free,” and “fair”).
21 This Day In History: South Africa Holds First Multiracial Elections, HISTORY.COM, http://
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/south-africa-holds-first-multiracial-elections.
22 Id.
23 KENDE, supra note 19, at 34 (describing the “Interim Constitution”).
24 Id. at 6–7 (characterizing the South African Constitution as more progressive than the
U.S. Constitution because it provides for and protects certain rights and liberties that are not
within the direct scope of the U.S. Constitution such as prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation, authorizing affirmative action, and providing a right to healthcare and a
right to unionize).
25
See generally CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Alec
C. Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 2009).
26 S. AFR. CONST. § 19, 1996, available at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/imag
es/a108-96.pdf.
27 See generally Minister of Home Affairs v. NICRO 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/10.pdf; August v. Electoral Comm’n
1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1999/3.pdf.
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The achievement of the franchise [of universal adult sufferage]
has historically been important both for the acquisition of the
rights of full and effective citizenship by all South Africans
regardless of race, and for the accomplishment of an allembracing nationhood . . . The vote of each and every citizen is
a badge of dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says
that everybody counts.28
Although neither August nor subsequent case law stand for the notion that
the right to vote is absolute and can never be limited by government
regulation, South African case law evidences support for a high bar to the
lawful imposition of any such limitation.29
The South African approach to criminal disenfranchisement is admirable
and instructive. Rejecting the institutionalized racial discrimination of its
recent past, South Africa has embraced the modern variant of the democratic
ideal.30 Since its formation, the South African Constitutional Court has
conducted thorough and careful interpretation of their constitution—and the
rights afforded and protected therein—with regard to many issues and areas
of the law.31 In South Africa’s constitutional backdrop, if not always
explicitly or emphatically mentioned, rests the notion of an important
vigilance in ensuring that any formal vestiges of racial oppression are
identified and eradicated.32
Imprisonment has a particularly complex and unfortunate history in South
Africa. Under Apartheid, imprisonment was routinely used as a means to
organize society along racial lines, impose social control, and restrict
political reform and debate.33 Perhaps in part because of an awareness of this
28

1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para. 17 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAC
C/19 99/3.pdf.
29 Id.
30 KENDE, supra note 19, at ix, 8.
31 See id. at 9–10 (describing South Africa’s progressive approach to many human rights
issues).
32 See, e.g., S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 art. 251, available at http://www.gov.za/docume
nts/constitution/constitution-republc-south-africa-act-200-1993 (“This Constitution provides a
historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict,
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights,
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans,
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.”).
33 Lukas Muntingh & Julia Sloth-Nielsen, The Ballot as a Bulwark: Prisoners’ Right to
Vote in South Africa, in CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
221 (Alec C. Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 2009).
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history, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has applied a careful rigor
to their task of judicial upkeep of South Africa’s constitutional guarantees.
The Constitutional Court has not sought to provide quick judgments in
atonement for its recent past but rather has issued opinions offering a careful
and balanced analysis of contested law and its relation to the rights protected
under their new constitution.34 Pointedly, the Constitutional Court, while not
establishing an absolute right to vote, has consistently invalidated attempts to
place restrictions on access to the ballot, even for individuals currently
incarcerated.35
The judicial approach generally used by the United States in evaluating
issues of constitutionality is quite similar to that employed by South Africa.
In the realm of felon disenfranchisement, however, the end result of those
similar approaches has been markedly different.36 The highest courts of both
countries have allowed, or allowed for the possibility of, the restriction of
voting rights in some circumstances. Thus, both courts recognize and affirm
the principle that in democratic society the right to vote is not absolute. The
engines of these limitations are unique to their respective countries, but it is
relevant that both regard the legitimacy of criminal disenfranchisement to
depend on a balance of qualified constitutional rights and a potentially
legitimate, limited government interest in their restriction.37
Many similarities exist between the major social and political battles
fought over race in the United States and South Africa in the twentieth
century.38 The countries share a long, common history of racial subjugation

34

KENDE, supra note 19, at 10.
Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the ReIntegration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) paras. 65–67 (s. Afr.); August v.
Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
36 Compare Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding a California felon
disenfranchisement law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment), with August v. Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.) (stating
felon disenfranchisement is unconstitutional in South Africa absent legitimate legislation to
the contrary).
37 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that a California felon
disenfranchisement law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Minister of Home Affairs v. NICRO (3) SA 280 (CC) paras. 65–67 (S. Afr.)
(holding that without more justification the felon disenfranchisement law at issue was
unconstitutional).
38 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts:
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1990) (discussing the failure of the
South African courts in the Apartheid era and the separate but shared experiences related to
racial discrimination in the American and South African courts).
35
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and purposeful marginalization of racial minority groups.39 In both
countries, law sanctioned overt discrimination while presiding governments
took an explicit and active role in the practice of racial oppression.40
Fortunately, both countries have also fought to overcome this shameful
history and assert the existence of a nation reborn, its institutions no longer
afflicted by the racial discrimination of its past.41 Yet, despite these laudable
aspirations, the modern political reality of both South Africa and the United
States indicates that this shared dream of equality has not been fully realized.
In addition to this common social and political backdrop, there are also
informative commonalities between the governmental structures of both
nations. South Africa and the United States are constitution-based
democratic republics. The Constitution of South Africa was modeled in part
on the United States Constitution, but would ultimately further advance the
notion of what constitutes fundamental and inalienable democratic rights.42
Indeed, the Constitution of South Africa is considered by some scholars to
provide the most expansive constitutional protections in the world.43 The
Constitutional Court of South Africa is also roughly analogous to the
Supreme Court of the United States, with a similar political role, multimember composition, and judicial process.44 Both countries’ highest courts
have been actors in social change through the process of interpreting the
boundaries of the fundamental rights afforded by their respective
constitutions.45
Thus, these commonalities present a functional and
instructive backdrop that encourages effective comparative analysis between

39

Id. at 486–87.
Id. at 545–46, 573–82.
41 Id. at 573–82.
42 KENDE, supra note 19, at 6.
43 Id. at 4 (citing CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 261
(2001)).
44 Id. at 8–10. One importance difference between the courts is that the Constitutional
Court of South Africa decides only constitutional questions. In this way, it has a more narrow
and specific focus than the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 10.
45 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding states are required to
provide indigent criminal defendants with legal counsel pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments); Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S.
Afr.) (holding that the state is constitutionally obligated to provide affirmative assistance to
those experiencing extreme poverty and homelessness, including but not limited to assistance
in the provision of adequate housing); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding
state laws establishing separate but equal segregated public schools unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
40
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the criminal disenfranchisement case law, and corresponding constitutional
bedrock, of the United States and South Africa.
Importantly, South Africa—though committed to its constitution and the
ideals of freedom, dignity, and equality—is not a democratic utopia. South
Africa continues to experience high unemployment,46 high levels of violent
crime,47 and general economic contraction.48 The latter two of these
conditions have both been cited by South Africa legislators in defense of
restrictions on prisoners’ rights to vote.49 Nonetheless, the South African
Constitutional Court has recognized that the right to vote exists above such
state interests—above mere partisan, political maneuvering to appear tough
on crime or cognizant and protective of economic interests—and can only be
restricted with substantial factual findings of state necessity.50 In South
Africa, the right to vote seemingly rests on particularly intractable, though
not completely impenetrable, constitutional ground.51
The situation in the United States is very different. Although there is a
considerable amount of federal law protecting the right to vote, felon
disenfranchisement has essentially been accepted by the federal courts.52
This Note argues that this unquestioned acceptance should not stand.
Though these restrictions are based, at least in part, on enumerated
allowances within the Constitution,53 the ideals of democracy demand a
reexamination of the legal framework used to analyze current felon
disenfranchisement provisions. In recent years, the American political
landscape has again been increasingly embroiled in a highly visible political
debate questioning the racial neutrality of both the criminal justice system

46

Patrick McGroarty, South Africa Unemployment Hits 11-Year High, WALL ST. J. (May 26,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-africa-unemployment-hits-11-year-high-1432640795.
47 See Why South Africa is (a bit) Less Violent Than You Might Think, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13,
2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economist-explains-5?zi
d=317&ah=8a47fc455a44945580198768fad0fa41/ (explaining that despite high levels of
violent crime, crime rates are falling in South Africa).
48 Linda Yueh, The Jobs Challenge Facing South Africa, BBC NEWS (May 9, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-27337520.
49
Minister of Home Affairs v. NICRO, 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) paras. 40, 54 (S. Afr.).
50 Id. paras. 65–67.
51 Id.; August v. Electoral Comm’n, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
52 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding a California felon
disenfranchisement law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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and various state electoral laws.54 Felon disenfranchisement laws touch both
of these issues. Moreover, these laws are highly relevant in their potential to
distort the composition of the voting electorate and perversely influence the
governing political agenda.55
The United States could benefit from utilizing an approach similar to that
of South Africa–by balancing the individual’s rights to vote and the state’s
ability to limit that right—when analyzing constitutional challenges to
criminal disenfranchisement laws. Specifically, the federal courts of the
United States should recognize the democratic value of the strong suffrage
rights supported by the Constitution of South Africa. The sheer number of
persons affected by criminal disenfranchisement laws in the United States
provides further urgency to this matter.56 The ongoing discriminatory impact
of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States collides with the notion
of an evolving democratic ideal to provide compelling cause to re-evaluate
these laws and to consider the judgment of other, similarly situated
democratic countries. Finally, with the ever-present backdrop of race, it is
vital to consider the practical consequences, however unpleasant or
politically and socially stigmatized, of felon disenfranchisement.
This Note argues the current state of felon disenfranchisement laws in the
United States fails to satisfy the modern democratic ideal and should be
freshly assessed, debated and, ultimately, reformed. Further, this Note posits
that—in an area of law dominated by history, race, and fundamental notions
of democracy—the relatively recent transformation in South Africa provides
a particularly vital and effective point for comparative analysis of the legal
structure that supports criminal disenfranchisement in the United States.
Part II of this Note examines felon disenfranchisement laws in the United
States, including their evolution through the Reconstruction Era to the
modern form of facially race neutral laws currently classified as non-punitive
regulation only secondarily linked to criminal conviction. Part II further
illustrates that the United States is an outlier among democratic nations
regarding the prevalence and severity of felon disenfranchisement laws.
54

See generally Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (holding the
state interests in support of an Indiana statute requiring voters to present state issued
identification to vote outweighed the potential impositions on voters); Frank v. Walker, 768
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding a Wisconsin voter identification requirement did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause or the Voting Rights Act).
55 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 5 (“One study found that disenfranchisement policies likely
affected the results of seven U.S. Senate races from 1970 to 1998 as well as the hotly
contested 2000 Bush–Gore presidential election.”).
56 Id. at 3 (stating that the criminal disenfranchisement rate rose to 5.85 million by 2010).
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Finally, Part II enumerates and analyzes the traditional legal claims pursued
by individuals in the United States attempting to challenge felon
disenfranchisement laws as unconstitutional.
Part III of this Note focuses on the re-invention of the democratic ideal in
post-Apartheid South Africa; specifically discussing the effect this process
has had on criminal disenfranchisement laws. Part III begins with an
overview of the content and structure of the Constitution of South African
and discusses how South Africa’s Constitutional Court interprets this
document. This section devotes specific attention to the notion of
transformative constitutionalism emphasized by leading judicial authorities
in South Africa. Finally, Part III examines two important decisions by the
Constitutional Court of South Africa concerning criminal disenfranchisement
and will analyze the implications of these holdings within the broader
framework of the modern democratic ideal.
Part IV of this Note argues that there is a useful comparison between both
the history of racial discrimination and the current state of criminal
disenfranchisement in the United States and South Africa. Part IV begins
with a brief assessment of why this shared history of racial oppression allows
for effective comparative analysis. Next, this section discusses the
relationship between the South African notion of transformative
constitutionalism and the influence and weight of history. Finally, Part IV
proposes a new path forward for the consideration of criminal
disenfranchisement laws by the federal courts of the United States.
II. BACKGROUND [U.S.]
A. The Changing Face and Form of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the
United States
Criminal disenfranchisement laws have changed considerably in character
and application throughout the history of the United States. Criminal
disenfranchisement laws were originally intended to be individualized and
explicitly punitive measures used to protect the perceived purity of the
electorate.57 After the Civil War, felon disenfranchisement laws took on a
new, more nefarious shape. Many states, particularly those in the former
Confederacy, used criminal disenfranchisement as a tool to maintain the
57 Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement
Law in the United States, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1045, 1082.
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white-dominated, political status quo and to insulate white southerners from
the political influence of newly freed blacks.58 The position of state election
laws within the dual sovereign system of the United States also made it so
this practice would be largely immune from federal intervention, particularly
in the years after the Supreme Court’s dismantling of the Civil Rights Act of
1875.59 Criminal disenfranchisement provisions were thus used in this
manner for nearly a century throughout the American South.
The overtly racist implementation and restructuring of felon
disenfranchisement laws in the years following the Civil War is no longer the
norm; yet, because of the historical prevalence of these laws and the modern
inequities of the criminal justice system, they continue to have a startlingly
discriminatory effect.60 At present, this empirically proven reality has not
persuaded the federal courts. The current position of the Supreme Court
(originating in oft-repeated dicta) is that criminal disenfranchisement is a
collateral consequence of criminal conviction and is not inherently
punitive.61 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of felon
disenfranchisement on all but one occasion.62 With this considerable hurdle,
litigants have still attempted to challenge criminal disenfranchisement in
federal and state courts, almost uniformly without ultimate success.63 Felon

58

Id. at 1090.
See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding Enforcement Act penalties
for depriving or conspiring to deprive the right to vote cannot be enforced against private
citizens).
60 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 2–3.
61 One example of the Supreme Court’s position can be found in a case involving
citizenship rights following military desertion. In Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren, in
dicta, stated
A person who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty
and often his right to vote. If, in the exercise of the power to protect banks,
both sanctions were imposed for the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the
statutes authorizing both disabilities would be penal. But because the
purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility
for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to
regulate the franchise.
356 U.S. 96 (1958).
62
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding an Alabama criminal
disenfranchisement law unconstitutional because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory
intent and had a correspondingly discriminatory impact).
63 See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(per curiam) (holding a state disenfranchisement statute did not violate the Voting Rights Act
because the plaintiffs did not present evidence of intentional discrimination in the state’s
criminal law system); Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (holding a
59
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disenfranchisement laws in the United States today are automatic and
invisible machinations of the criminal justice system—vis-à-vis electoral
regulations enacted by the state—making them particularly difficult to
challenge constitutionally. Yet, despite this reality, it is imperative that such
a significant and intractable form of disenfranchisement does not escape
careful review.
1. Criminal Disenfranchisement Prior to the Civil War
Criminal disenfranchisement had a vastly different form in the early
history of the United States.64 Disenfranchisement, seen as a discrete
punishment, applied only to those serious crimes that indicated an individual
lacked the moral virtue to be a participating member of society.65 The
judiciary, on an individualized basis, primarily dictated the terms and
imposition of this punishment; this judicial autonomy was consistent until
later reform in the time immediately prior to and following the Civil War.66
Although the application of felon disenfranchisement laws was limited in
the early history of the United States, the ability to disenfranchise because of
certain criminal convictions was nearly ubiquitous among the several
states.67 By 1821, eleven of the original colonies had adopted some form of
felon disenfranchisement laws in their individual state constitutions.68
Importantly, a wide variety of disenfranchisement was the norm at this time.
Voting was regarded as a selective privilegewomen, men without property,
blacks, and other marginalized groups were commonly excluded from
participation in the political process.69 Despite the ubiquity of voting
restrictions in the early history of the United States, wholesale criminal

Colorado disenfranchisement law preventing parolees from voting constitutional because the
parolees had not served their full imprisonment term).
64 See Ewald, supra note 57, at 1061–66 (discussing the history of criminal
disenfranchisement laws prior to the Civil War).
65
Id. at 1061–64.
66 Id. at 1062, 1065–66.
67 Id. at 1062–63.
68 Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering Without Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement
Constitutes Vote Denial Under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 61, 65 (2011).
69 Ewald, supra note 57, at 1064.
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disenfranchisement as practiced today was completely foreign to early
American society.70
The practice of selective suffrage indicates that racial discrimination was
not at the core of pre-Civil War criminal disenfranchisement.71 Instead,
criminal disenfranchisement was viewed as a unique punishment enacted to
protect against undue corruption of the qualified and upstanding electorate
by excluding individuals who lacked moral virtue.72 For this reason, most
state criminal disenfranchisement laws focused on crimes demonstrating
serious violation of the moral code: crimes that were “infamous,”
“notoriously scandalous,” or otherwise indicative of personal corruption or
moral bankruptcy.73
2. In the Aftermath of the Civil War: Reconstruction and the Introduction
of Race in Laws of Criminal Disenfranchisement
The end of the Civil War brought profound change to the legal order of
voting rights in the United States, particularly in the former Confederate
states. In the “relatively brief but extraordinary period of black advancement
known as the Reconstruction Era,” landmark federal legislation abolished
slavery, bestowed full citizenship upon African-Americans, mandated due
process and equal protection of the laws for all citizens, and prohibited the
denial of the right to vote on the basis of race.74 This was a major change for
the entire country, but was felt most acutely in the Southern states. Indeed,
with the creation of a new, numerous, and potentially powerful black
electorate, the still-embedded ruling power structure of the Southern states
sought new methods for maintaining political and social control.75 Eventual
Secretary of Treasury Carter Glass, while serving as a delegate to the
Virginia convention in 1906, stated “[w]e are here to discriminate to the very
70

See generally id. at 1064–65 (noting the changes in criminal disenfranchisement in the
late 1800s that led to the use of criminal disenfranchisement as a means of racial
discrimination).
71 Bailey Figler, Note, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723, 729 (2006).
72 Id. at 728–29.
73
Ewald, supra note 57, at 1063–64.
74 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 29–30 (2010).
75 John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the Eighth
Amendment, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 762–63 (2013) (“Southern states used
disenfranchisement to deny African Americans the vote and as a means of curtailing the rights
they had gained after the Civil War.”).
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extremity of permissible action under the limitation of the Federal
Constitution, with a view to the eliminating of every negro voter who can be
gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of
the white electorate.”76 Historical records indicate this was a common
sentiment among the governing white power structure of the South in the
post-Reconstruction era.77
This behavior would continue, subject to only occasional restriction, until
the passing of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.78 Nearly all of the many
methods employed to promote segregation and discrimination during the
Reconstruction Era and beyond have been declared unconstitutional or
abandoned as indefensible.79 Only criminal disenfranchisement has the
distinction of continued and persistent existence.80
In the wake of Reconstruction, lawmakers began to write and amend
criminal disenfranchisement statutes to specifically target crimes deemed
more likely to be committed by blacks than whites.81 This rewriting of
classifications in the criminal code was widespread in the South. For
example, in 1869, Mississippi had a constitutional provision disenfranchising
those guilty of “any crime.”82 In 1890, this provision was limited to enforce
disenfranchisement only those with convictions for specific crimes—crimes
for which blacks were specifically targeted and more likely to be
prosecuted.83 Numerous other examples convey that “between 1890 and
1910, several Southern states altered their criminal disenfranchisement laws
with the express intent of removing blacks from the rolls.”84 Georgia and
Alabama, in 1877 and 1901 respectively, passed similar laws at state
constitutional conventions permanently barring those convicted of a crime of
“moral turpitude” from voting, regardless of whether that crime mandated

76 The Heritage Museum, The Harrisonburg-Rockingham Experience: African-American
Education During Segregation, http://www.heritagecenter.com/Web_Pages/Museum/Collecti
on/blackedu/jimcrow.html.
77 Id.; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (“[T]he Alabama
Constitutional Convention of 1901 was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction
South to disenfranchise blacks.”).
78 See generally Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952).
79 Ewald, supra note 57, at 1122–27.
80 Id. at 1065–66, 1122–27.
81 Id. at 1090–91.
82 Id. at 1091.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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incarceration.85 Many misdemeanors became crimes of moral turpitude;
particularly those crimes associated with the widespread dislocation of
landless, newly freed African-Americans and with the socio-economic
realities of being poor and marginalized in the post-Reconstruction American
South.86 Though some linguistic subterfuge was involved, the intent and
expectation of these laws was clear: discrimination on account of race would
continue in the South and it would be pushed to the outermost,
constitutionally permissible limits.
Though the Southern power structure changed the language it used to
effect discriminatory disenfranchisement out of constitutional necessity,
lawmakers made little effort to conceal racial motivation. Chief Justice
Cooper, writing for the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1896, wrote:
Within the field of permissible action under the limitations
imposed by the federal constitution, the convention swept the
circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by
the negro race. By reason of its previous condition of servitude
and dependence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain
peculiarities of habit, of temperament, and of character, which
clearly distinguished it as a race from that of the whites, a
patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory
within narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal
members given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust
crimes of the whites. Restrained by the federal constitution
from discriminating against the negro race, the convention
discriminated against its characteristics and the offenses to
which its weaker members were prone.87
In addition to this change regarding the underlying intent of criminal
disenfranchisement statutes, the post-Civil War modification of criminal
disenfranchisement laws also transformed the manner in which these laws
were applied.88 Individual deliberation by the judiciary was largely
eliminated.89 Instead, criminals were automatically disenfranchised upon
85

Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1094–95.
87 Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896).
88 See Ewald, supra note 57, at 1062 (describing the differences between “colonial and
contemporary criminal disenfranchisement”).
89 Id.
86
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conviction—rendering mandated disenfranchisement separate from direct
and individualized punitive sentencing.90 The effect of the change is hard to
overstate. The automatic and invisible nature of criminal disenfranchisement
laws has significantly contributed to the number of people so disenfranchised
and the inability of such disenfranchised persons to challenge the relevant
laws under the protections afforded by the Constitution.91 Further, this
automatic application is a residual effect of legal changes driven by racism
and a want for political oppression. Despite this history, criminal
disenfranchisement laws continue to exist and operate in the United States.
3. The Current State of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States
Although the explicit discriminatory intent of the post-Civil War era is
gone, felon disenfranchisement remains pervasive, legal, and nearly
unimpeachable. Following the enactment of the Voting Rights Act,
legislators amended felon disenfranchisement laws to remove any expression
of discriminatory intent.92 Nonetheless, these policies of disenfranchisement
continue to have a clearly disproportionate impact on racial minorities.93 As
will be discussed further in Part IV, the automatic application of
disenfranchisement resulting from criminal conviction is at the core of this
disparity.
There are numerous differences in the scope and structure of state
disenfranchisement laws; most have withstood various challenges to their
legality in the federal courts.94 Indeed, as will be discussed further, the

90

Id.
See generally Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that individuals with
felony convictions can be barred from voting without violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs
seeking to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under the VRA based on a showing of
racial discrimination within the criminal justice system must show intentional discrimination
within the criminal justice system driving the enactment of a felon disenfranchisement
statute).
92 See Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 171 n.64 (2001)
(describing amendments to state criminal laws in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Virginia).
93 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 7, at 1–2.
94 See Ghaelian, supra note 75, at 766–73 (discussing the common challenges to criminal
disenfranchisement laws).
91
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Supreme Court has rejected challenges made to felon disenfranchisement
laws alleging an impermissibly discriminatory racial effect.95
As of 2010, 5.85 million people were disenfranchised in the United States
because of a felony conviction.96 Felon disenfranchisement accounts for
2.5% of the voting age population—one in every forty adult American
citizens.97
Six of the ten states with the highest percentage of
disenfranchised felons are former Confederate states.98 Florida and
Mississippi, the states with the highest felon disenfranchisement rates,
disenfranchise 10.4% and 8.2% of their respective, otherwise voting eligible
electorate.99
There is considerable variety in the scope, structure, and severity of state
felon disenfranchisement laws. Forty-eight states provide for some form of
felon disenfranchisement; only two states, Maine and Vermont, have no such
voting restriction.100 Thirty-four states prohibit individuals on parole from
voting; thirty of those states also deny voting access to individuals on
probation.101 Twelve states ban felons from voting either permanently for
particular offenses or for a specified time following the completion of their
sentence (including probation or parole).102
Spanning the inconsistent patchwork of felon disenfranchisement laws,
there are two near-constants: (1) cumbersome, financially demanding, and
time intensive restoration procedures for regaining the right to vote, and (2)
rapid growth of those affected as a percentage of the otherwise eligible
electorate.103 While most states eventually allow individuals to regain their
right to vote, they must do so through a process that is often arduous and
unclear, causing many ex-offenders to never restore their voting eligibility.104
Some states additionally impose financial penalties on ex-offenders, making
the restoration process “a bureaucratic maze [requiring] the payment of fines
or court costs.”105
95 Id. at 766–69 (discussing challenges to criminal disenfranchisement under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act).
96 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 7, at 1.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 16 tbl.3.
99
Id.
100 Id. at 2, 3 tbl.1.
101 CHUNG, supra note 1, at 1 tbl.1.
102 Id.
103 ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 154–55; see also CHUNG, supra note 1, at 3 fig.B.
104 ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 154.
105 Id.
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The character and construction of state felon disenfranchisement laws
make for a varied and complex legal framework. The ultimate outcome of
this framework has neither quality—the results are clear. Throughout the
United States, in the decades concurrent with its “War on Drugs,” there has
been a steady and dramatic rise in the number of people affected by felon
disenfranchisement laws.106 An estimated 1.17 million people were
disenfranchised because of felony convictions in 1976; by 2010, that number
had more than quadrupled.107
Although modern felon disenfranchisement law is clearly related to the
explosive expansion of the criminal justice system in the late twentieth
century, in the eyes of the federal courts these laws exist apart and distinct
from the machinations of criminal law.108 This understanding has proved
difficult for litigants to overcome in the federal courts.109 Particularly, this
unique interpretive framework has made it difficult to challenge felon
disenfranchisement either through traditional channels protecting minority
voting rights or on the grounds of constitutional guarantees of equal
protection under law.110
4. The Unique Nature of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the United
States
The American policy regarding felony disenfranchisement stands in stark
contrast to the like policies of European nations and other constitutional
democracies across the world. No European state has a blanket voting
prohibition, for any duration, for convicted criminals who have fully served
their sentence.111 Indeed, “[t]here are disagreements and debates within
106

See CHUNG, supra note 1, at 3 fig.B (depicting the dramatic rise in the population of the
disenfranchised population in the U.S. which corresponds to the years the U.S. effectuated its
War on Drug policy).
107 UGGEN, SHANNON & MANZA, supra note 6, at 1.
108 Ewald, supra note 57, at 1057–58 (noting that federal courts view felon
disenfranchisement as a “collateral consequence” of a criminal conviction rather than a
criminal punishment).
109 Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of
Debt, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 361–64 (2012) (discussing how felon disenfranchisement is
not afforded the traditional fundamental rights/equal protection analysis that generally protect
citizen’s voting rights).
110 Id. at 362–64 (discussing the equal protection analysis of felon disenfranchisement
applied in Richardson); Ghaelian, supra note 75, at 768–70 (discussing the common Voting
Rights Act challenges to felon disenfranchisement).
111 ISPAHANI, supra note 2, at 4–5.
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European nations over disenfranchisement – but the debate is which
prisoners should be barred from voting. In almost all cases, the debate stops
at the prison walls.”112 The United States is alone amongst similarly free
nations in its use of disenfranchisement laws where “disqualification is
automatic, pursues no defined purpose, and affects millions.”113 Two
influential, recent decisions from the European Court of Human Rights and
the Canadian Supreme Court highlight this disparity.
In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued its
decision in Hirst v. United Kingdom (Hirst No. 2), affirming that “an
absolute bar on voting by any serving prisoner in any circumstance” was an
unlawful violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention of
Human Rights.114 While the ECtHR recognized that nations have some
discretion to limit prisoner voting in specific and limited circumstances, the
court noted that “universal suffrage has become the basic principle.”115 The
Hirst No. 2 opinion stressed that the United Kingdom could not provide a
legitimate and proportional rationale for imposing an automatic and absolute
voting ban on incarcerated individuals.116 The ECtHR made clear that “the
ballot is a right, not a privilege, and that the presumption in democratic states
must be in favor of inclusion.”117
The Canadian Supreme Court, like the ECtHR, has also allowed some
level of governmental discretion in restricting access to the ballot but has
generally favored a basic presumption in support of robust voting rights. In
Suave v. Canada (Suave No. 2), the Canadian government argued that the
Supreme Court of Canada should uphold a federal electoral law that
disenfranchised prisoners serving sentences longer than two years.118 The
Canadian government had expressly amended the law to be permissible
under the notwithstanding clause in Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.119 In the Charter, the notwithstanding clause “allows
certain fundamental rights to be limited by Parliament.”120
112

Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 6.
114 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 681, ¶¶ 41, 99(1) (2005), available
at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2005/681.html.
115
Id. ¶ 59.
116 Id. ¶¶ 73–85.
117 ISPAHANI, supra note 2, at 17.
118 Suavé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, available at https://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2010/index.do.
119 Id.
120 ISPAHANI, supra note 2, at 12.
113
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The Canadian Supreme Court struck down the amended electoral law.121
The court ruled that the right to vote was of special importance and not
subject to the provisions of the notwithstanding clause.122 Thus, for a
restriction on the right to vote to be legitimate, the court held that the
limitation must be “demonstrably justified,” according to Section 1 of the
Charter.123 In short, to satisfy the demonstrable justification requirement, the
government must prove that the aims of the law justified the voting right
restriction.124 Instead, the court found there was: (1) not sufficient evidence
of a rational connection between crime and punishment, (2) restriction of
voting rights was not an effective educational tool, (3) disenfranchisement
was inconsistent with the democratic rule of law, and (4) that, as punishment,
disenfranchisement was arbitrary and excessively disproportionate in
scope.125 On the irrationality of prisoner disenfranchisement, the Canadian
Supreme Court wrote: “depriving at-risk individuals of their sense of
collective identity and membership in the community is unlikely to instill a
sense of responsibility and community identity, while the right to participate
in voting helps teach democratic values and social responsibility.”126
Finding all arguments provided by the state unsuccessful in defeating the
presumption of unrestricted franchise, the court wrote: “Denying a citizen the
right to vote denies the basis of democratic legitimacy . . . Denying prisoners
the right to vote . . . removes a route to social development and
rehabilitation . . . and it undermines the correctional law and policy directed
toward rehabilitation and integration.”127
It is important to note that in both these cases the issue was the voting
rights of currently incarcerated prisoners. For both courts, the idea of an
automatic ban on voting for ex-offenders would presumably be an
impermissible violation of electoral law, beyond the scope of reasonable
debate. This brief comparative analysis supports the notion that, in the realm
of criminal disenfranchisement, the United States is an outlier among modern
democratic nations.
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Id.
Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Suavé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, available at https://scccsc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2010/index.do.
127 Id.
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B. The Disparate Racial Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the
United States
The scale of vote-denial permitted by felon disenfranchisement laws
should be worrisome for the world’s oldest constitutional democracy.
Further, the disparate effect these laws have on historically oppressed and
marginalized racial minorities should be cause for immediate concern.
Overwhelmingly, felon disenfranchisement laws disproportionately affect
African-Americans.128 Over 2 million African-Americans are currently
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.129 This results in the
disenfranchisement of 7.7% black adults otherwise eligible to vote,
compared to the 1.8% criminal disfranchisement rate of the non-black
population.130 These figures are national averages; in three states—Florida,
Kentucky, and Virginia—more than one in five black adults are
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.131
The numbers are even worse for black men. Thirteen percent of the adult
black male population, 1.4 million people, is disenfranchised because of a
felony conviction.132 This is seven times the national average rate of
criminal disenfranchisement.133 Research indicates that if the current
incarceration rates remain steady, in the next generation, three out of every
ten black men can expect to be disenfranchised during their lifetime.134 In
states that disenfranchise ex-offenders, 40% of the adult black male
population may permanently lose their voting rights.135
128

CHUNG, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
130 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 1 (2014),
[hereinafter FACT SHEET: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT] available at http://www.sentencing
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Felony-Disenfranchisement-Laws-in-the-US.pdf.
131 Id. See also BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION EFFORTS IN
VIRGINIA (Oct. 14, 2016), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rightsrestoration-efforts-virginia (“Virginia is one of four states whose constitution permanently
disenfranchises citizens with past felony convictions but grants the state’s governor the
authority to restore voting rights. After a July 2016 Virginia Supreme Court decision
invalidated an executive order restoring voting rights to over 200,000 citizens, the state’s
governor announced his plan to issue individual restorations for citizens who have completed
the terms of their sentence, including probation and parole.”).
132 Jonathan Sgro, Note, Intentional Discrimination in Farrakhan v. Gregoire: The Ninth
Circuit’s Voting Rights Act Standard “Results In” the New Jim Crow, 57 VILL. L. REV. 139,
140 (2012).
133 Id.
134 FACT SHEET: FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, supra note 130, at 1–2.
135 Id.
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The disproportionate impact of felon disenfranchisement laws along
racial lines is undeniable and pervasive. This is true despite the fact that no
standing state disenfranchisement law has any express racial element in
either intent or form.136 It is impossible to view the phenomenon of felon
disenfranchisement without considering the radical transformation of the
criminal justice system in size, scope and, sentencing structure that has been
enacted across partisan divides and presidential administrations over the past
thirty-five years.137 The modern criminal justice system, like the felon
disenfranchisement laws with which it is inherently intertwined, operates
without explicit racial discrimination, and yet has an overwhelmingly
disproportionate effect on the black population.138
C. Efforts to Challenge Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States
Federal disenfranchisement laws are ubiquitous in the United States but
they have not gone unchallenged. Affected individuals, political policy
groups, and a minority of nationally visible politicians have sought reform of
felon disenfranchisement. Several types of legal challenges have been
brought against felon disenfranchisement laws in the United States.139 To
date, these challenges have been largely unsuccessful.140 This section will
explore the various channels claimants have used in the past to challenge
felon disenfranchisement laws in the federal courts. Specifically, this section
will highlight challenges to criminal disenfranchisement provisions
previously brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and will examine the current relevant governing law in the
several federal circuits.
1. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
The Fourteenth Amendment is perhaps the strongest constitutional source
for contesting impermissibly discriminatory election laws. Yet, ironically,
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws brought under the protections of

136

See supra Part II.A.3 (describing the changes to disenfranchisement laws following the
Voting Rights Act and the current state of felon disenfranchisement laws in the U.S.).
137 See ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 153–56 (describing how criminal disenfranchisement
fits into the modern criminal justice system and affects the African-American population).
138 CARSON, supra note 16.
139 Ghaelian, supra note 75, at 766–73.
140 Id. at 767, 769–70.

2016]

VOTING RIGHTS

425

the Fourteenth Amendment have been almost completely denied by modern
rulings of the Supreme Court.141
In Richardson v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court first encountered the issue of
felon disenfranchisement and its constitutionality under the Fourteenth
Amendment.142 The plaintiffs in Richardson, three individuals barred from
voting because of previous convictions constituting “infamous crimes” under
California’s Constitution, brought a class petition asserting that this restriction
on suffrage was a violation of a fundamental right under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby subject to strict scrutiny
analysis.143 Petitioners argued that the State of California must prove that it
has a compelling state interest for the felon disenfranchisement provision if the
provision was to withstand a test of constitutionality.144 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority of the Court, dismissed this argument, reversing the
prior decision by the California Supreme Court, and upheld the
constitutionality of California’s expansive felon disenfranchisement
provisions.145
In a strident dissent, Justice Marshall urged that the Court follow the
typical Equal Protection framework.146 Justice Marshall noted that a
disparate classification of individuals regarding a fundamental right is
necessarily subject to a tripartite analysis.147 According to this framework,
when a fundamental right is restricted by the state, that state has the
significant burden of proving that (1) the challenged law is necessary to a
“legitimate and substantial state interest,” (2) the classification involved is
precisely drawn, and (3) that “there are no other reasonable ways to achieve
the State’s goal with a lesser burden on the constitutionally protected
interest.”148 In Richardson, the majority never conducted this analysis.
Instead, the Court held that the affirmative sanction of criminal

141

See generally Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding individuals with
felony convictions may be barred from voting without violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment). But see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating the criminal
disenfranchisement provision of the Alabama Constitution as impermissible under the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection because evidence demonstrated it was enacted
with a discriminatory purpose).
142
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
143 Id. at 26–27, 54.
144 Id. at 33, 54.
145 Id. at 56.
146 Id. at 77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 78.
148 Id.
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disenfranchisement in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment made the
normal Equal Protection analysis unnecessary.149
Justice Rehnquist provided an exhaustive legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment to support the Court’s reasoning that:
[T]he understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment, as reflected in the express language of Sec. 2 and
in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment’s
applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons,
[distinguishes] such laws from those other state limitations on
the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause by this Court.150
The Court thereby found explicit congressional approval of felon
disenfranchisement and held it unnecessary for the state to carry the burden
of typical Equal Protection analysis.151 Always the unbending advocate for a
more fully realized and consistently applicable American equality, Justice
Marshall ardently disagreed, writing: “The ballot is the democratic system’s
coin of the realm. To condition its exercise on support of the established
order is to debase the currency beyond recognition.”152
The Supreme Court’s holding in Richardson has prevented Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to state felon disenfranchisement laws in all
instances except those involving a clear demonstration that the law was
enacted with an impermissibly racially discriminatory intent. In Hunter v.
Underwood, the Supreme Court held, for the first—and only—time, that a
state felon disenfranchisement law was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.153
In Hunter, the petitioners alleged that a criminal
disenfranchisement provision in the Alabama Constitution was enacted with
a racially discriminatory purpose and that it had such an impact.154 The
Court held that the law was facially race neutral and that therefore a racially
discriminatory purpose and intent must be proven to establish a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.155 The burden of proof rested on a two-part test
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 54 (majority opinion).
Id. at 41–52, 54.
Id. at 54–54.
Id. at 83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
471 U.S. 222 (1985).
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 227–28.
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requiring (1) the challengers show that racial discrimination was a
“substantial or motivating factor” in the legislature’s choice to disenfranchise
criminals and, if this is established, (2) the state to prove that the provision
would have been enacted in the absence of any racially discriminatory
motive.156
After review of the historical record of Alabama’s Constitutional
Convention, including the rare smoking gun of an intact legislative record
detailing the rampant racially discriminatory animus behind the provision, the
Court held that the legislative record indicated the intent necessary to render
the provision unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.157 Despite
the positive result for the petitioners in Hunter, the case does little to improve a
prospective claimant’s ability to challenge felon disenfranchisement under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, the combination of the Richardson
endorsement of the “affirmative sanction” of felon disenfranchisement found
in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment158 and the Hunter requirement of
intentional discrimination has created a significant impediment for litigants
attempting to challenge the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement
provisions.
2. Previous Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement under the Voting
Rights Act
The roadblocks to litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment have led
recent challengers of felon disenfranchisement laws to pursue claims under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Section 2 provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color.159
A key fact distinguishing claims made under Section 2 of the VRA is that,
unlike Fourteenth Amendment claims, “proof of discriminatory intent is not

156
157
158
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Id.
Id. at 229–31.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2014).
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required to establish a violation of Section 2.”160 This lesser burden was
made explicit by the amendments to the VRA passed by Congress in 1982
and has subsequently been affirmed by the Supreme Court.161
As mandated by Congress, to successfully challenge a felon
disenfranchisement provision under Section 2, a plaintiff must establish (1)
that Section 2 is applicable and allows a challenge to felon
disenfranchisement, and (2) felon disenfranchisement “results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color.”162 The key hurdle for litigants pursuing a Section
2 claim is the threshold of applicability of the VRA to felon
disenfranchisement provisions. There is currently a significant circuit split
arising from this first threshold requirement.163
The Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson v. Governor, rejected the plaintiffs’
claim that Section 2 of the VRA permitted challenges to felon
disenfranchisement laws.164 The plaintiffs in Johnson, convicted felons who
had fully served their prison sentences, sought to overturn Florida’s felon
disenfranchisement provisions under both the Fourteenth Amendment and
Section 2 of the VRA.165 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment claim based on the Supreme Court precedent of Richardson v.
Ramirez.166 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 2 could not be
applicable because it would create a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment
and its affirmative sanction of criminal disenfranchisement.167 The Johnson
court held that Section 2 could only be a proper channel to challenge felon
disenfranchisement laws if there was “a clear statement from Congress
endorsing [that] understanding.”168 Finding no such statement—and weary
of Congress potentially exceeding its enforcement powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment in passing the VRA, if the Act was indeed applicable
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to felon disenfranchisement laws—the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
petitioners’ claims.169
The Second Circuit soon encountered the same issue in Hayden v.
Pataki.170 The plaintiffs in Hayden sought to overturn New York’s felon
disenfranchisement statute under the VRA; their claim was rejected.171 The
court, like the Eleventh Circuit, performed a thorough statutory analysis of
the VRA in deciding its applicability to the felon disenfranchisement
statute.172 The court concluded that if read out of context, the plain language
of the VRA could be read to include felon disenfranchisement provisions.173
Thus, given the context of history and congressional intent, the court held
that felon disenfranchisement statutes are presumptively constitutional, citing
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “explicit approval.”174 The Second Circuit,
like the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson, emphasized the clear statement rule,
holding that unless a statement from Congress made it unmistakably clear
that it intended to alter the federal balance (by indirectly adjusting the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment), Congress did not intend the VRA
to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.175 The only door left open by the
Hayden Court to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws was the Fourteenth
Amendment and the corresponding proof of intentional discrimination, per
Hunter.
Three years later, in Simmons v. Galvin, the First Circuit issued a nearly
identical holding—in both analysis and result—as found in Hayden.176 In
Simmons, the court held that felon disenfranchisement provisions are

169 Id. at 1234–35. Notably, the court offered the following in the penultimate paragraph of
its decision:
Several amici curiae argue that, as a policy matter, felons should be
enfranchised, particularly those who have served their sentences and
presumably paid their debt to society. Even if we were to agree with the
amici, this is a policy decision that the United States Constitution expressly
gives to the state governments, not the federal courts. Florida has
legislatively reexamined this provision since 1868 and affirmed its decision
to deny felons the right to vote. Federal courts cannot question the wisdom
of this policy choice.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
170
449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc).
171 Id. at 309–10.
172 Id. at 312–13.
173 Id. at 315.
174 Id. at 315–16.
175 Id. at 323–24, 328.
176 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009).
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presumptively constitutional, but that the VRA’s broad and ambiguous
language allows and encourages judicial inquiry beyond the text.177 After
reviewing the legislative history of the VRA, the 1982 amendments, and
post-1982 Congressional action, the First Circuit held that “Congress has
excepted from the reach of the VRA protections from vote denial for claims
against a state which disenfranchises incarcerated felons.”178 The three
decisions above from the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits all found the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “affirmative
sanction” on criminal disenfranchisement to preclude applicability of similar
claims under the VRA; the Ninth Circuit, however, did not.
3. The Ninth Circuit Changes the Game (And Then Changes Its Mind)
The Farrakhan cases from the Ninth Circuit currently constitute the most
successful challenges made to felon disenfranchisement statutes under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Farrakhan line of cases began with
a challenge made to Washington’s felon disenfranchisement statute by
several minority citizens denied the right to vote on account of previous
felony convictions.179 The core of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged,
“minorities are disproportionately prosecuted and sentenced, resulting in
their disproportionate representation among the persons disenfranchised
under the Washington Constitution.”180 To support this allegation, the
plaintiffs offered an abundance of factual evidence, citing studies indicating
that African-Americans were nine times more likely to be incarcerated
despite a 3.72:1 arrest ratio of African-Americans to whites, and 70% more
likely to be searched.181 Despite the strong factual record presented, the
district court granted summary judgment to the state and held that the
plaintiffs’ evidence was legally insufficient because it involved
discrimination in the criminal justice system only, not discrimination within
the felon disenfranchisement provision itself.182 Importantly, the district
court held that while the evidence was insufficient, challenges to felon
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disenfranchisement provisions were indeed cognizable under Section 2 of the
VRA.183
On appeal, in Farrakhan I, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that challenges to felon disenfranchisement provisions were
cognizable under Section 2,184 but ultimately reversed and remanded the case
back to the district court.185 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court as to the sufficiency of the evidence claim, holding evidence of
discrimination in the criminal justice system relevant under the “totality of
the circumstances” analysis required by Section 2.186 To support this view,
the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the nine factors included in a Senate
Report issued with the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act—
specifically factor 5, which advised consideration of the “social and
historical conditions” related to a law being challenged and analyzed under
the VRA.187 On remand, the district court found that plaintiffs’ evidence
regarding discrimination within the criminal justice system was “admissible,
relevant, and persuasive,”188 but nevertheless held that a totality of the
circumstances analysis, including an analysis of the nine Senate Report
factors, did not support the claim that Washington’s felon
disenfranchisement provision resulted in discrimination within the “electoral
process on account of race.”189 The district court therefore affirmed its
earlier ruling and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.190
The case was again heard on appeal before the Ninth Circuit,191 this time
in the wake of sister circuit decisions denying the applicability of the VRA
felon disenfranchisement provisions. Nonetheless, in Farrakhan II, the
Ninth Circuit found no reason to overturn its holding in Farrakhan I that
felon disenfranchisement provisions were cognizable under the VRA.192
Indeed, the court—rather remarkably in the face of the holdings of its sister
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circuits—went farther. In Farrakhan II, the court held that compelling,
direct evidence within the bounds of a single Senate Report factor could be
enough, in some instances, to be controlling in a totality of the circumstances
analysis.193 The court thereby re-examined the extensive factual record of
the lower court and held the plaintiffs had met their burden of proof—
Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law stood in violation of the Voting
Rights Act and constituted racially discriminatory vote denial.194
The rather momentous holding in Farrakhan II, the first decision in the
country of its kind,195 did not remain good law in the Ninth Circuit for long.
Just a few months later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the case
to be reheard en banc.196 In Farrakhan III, a per curiam opinion, the Ninth
Circuit altered its previous holding on the relationship between felon
disenfranchisement provisions and the VRA.197 The en banc court
acknowledged the significantly different views taken by the First, Second,
and Eleventh Circuits, and also recognized the long history of felon
disenfranchisement laws in the United States.198 In recognition of these
decisions and in deference to the underlying rationale, the court in
Farrakhan III held that their previous decision had “swe[pt] too broadly” and
could not stand.199 From here, the Ninth Circuit did something unusual:
referencing McCleskey v. Kemp200 and Hunter v. Underwood,201 both cases
involving Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court held that plaintiffs
seeking to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws under the VRA based on
a showing of racial discrimination within the criminal justice system must
show intentional discrimination driving the enactment of a felon
disenfranchisement statute.202 The court then held that the plaintiffs failed to
carry the burden of evidence, and affirmed the summary judgment awarded
to the defendants by the district court.203
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200 481 U.S. 279, 297–98 (1987).
201 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
202 Farrakhan III, 623 F.3d at 993–94.
203 Id. at 994.
194

2016]

VOTING RIGHTS

433

Notably, Farrakhan III did not overturn the Ninth Circuit’s prior rulings
holding Section 2 of the VRA applicable to felon disenfranchisement
provisions. For this reason, the circuits remain split. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari on this issue.204
III. BACKGROUND [SOUTH AFRICA]
Suffrage in post-Apartheid South Africa is considered a fundamental right
and any attempt to limit the suffrage of citizens must pass a strict test of
constitutionality.205 To facilitate a proper comparison between criminal
disenfranchisement in the United States and South Africa, it is necessary to
consider the history, purpose, and content of the new South African
Constitution of 1996, and how it is interpreted by the Constitutional Court of
South Africa. Secondly, this section will examine decisions made by the
Constitutional Court in two landmark cases concerning the voting rights of
prisoners. The United States can learn from the example of South Africa.
A. History, Content, and Structure of the South African Constitution
The current South African Constitution emerged out of a period of
political transformation marked by a transition from the National Party
controlled Apartheid era to the sweeping electoral victories of Nelson
Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994.206 In the late
1980s, back channel negotiations took place between the leaders of both the
National Party and the ANC to either draft a Bill of Rights to the
Constitution or draft of a wholly new constitutional document.207 A major
breakthrough occurred in 1990, when the ruling South African government
freed political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, and lifted the ban on
adverse political parties.208 Sensing the weakness of the National Party and
the environment of potentially transformative change, numerous interested
groups including the ANC, the National Party, the South African Law
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Commission, the Inkatha Freedom Party, and a group of liberal academics,
submitted draft constitutions.209
With the backdrop of change, caution, and spurts of violence, the MultiParty Negotiating Process (MPNP) officially began in 1993 in
Johannesburg.210 A system of working groups, including a Negotiating
Council and a series of Technical Committees, were informed by the
opinions of party leaders, political activists, legal scholars, and constitutional
experts from around the world.211 After the 1994 elections, a Constitutional
Assembly consisting of members from the new, democratically elected
National Assembly and Senate began working on the final Constitution;212
the Assembly eventually “reached a compromise on the final draft, now the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, in 1996, after over two years of
debate.”213
The South Africa Parliament asserts that its constitution “lays the
foundation for an open society based on democratic values, social justice and
fundamental human rights.”214 As with the U.S. Constitution, the South
African Constitution is considered the supreme law of the land; its provisions
must be followed by everyone, including the government.215 Notably, the
South African Constitution was created in direct response to the need for
radical change and new levels of equality in South Africa. The South
African government asserts
[b]efore its transition to a democratic, constitutional state,
South Africa was known as a country in which the rights and
freedoms of the majority of people were denied. To prevent
this from ever happening again, our Constitution contains a Bill
of Rights which can only be changed if two thirds of the
members of the National Assembly and six of the nine
provinces in the National Council of Provinces agree to such a
change.216
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The South African Constitution diverges from the U.S. Constitution in
that it goes significantly further in its bestowing of enumerated constitutional
rights.217
Both countries assure the protection of speech, suffrage,
association, political assembly, religious preference, and other wellestablished democratic rights.218 The South African Bill of Rights, however,
has a broader conception of equality than its American counterpart.219 The
South African Bill of Rights prohibits discrimination based on sexual
orientation, sanctions affirmative action, protects labor rights and the ability
to unionize, and guarantees human dignity as a fundamental right.220 The
South African Constitution also endows citizens with so-called “second and
third-generation rights,” including socioeconomic provisions establishing the
right to education, health care, housing; and solidarity rights, including the
right to a clean environment and cultural membership.221
Finally, two practical points are important to mention in a comparative
legal analysis involving South African Constitutional law. First, unlike the
U.S. Constitution, the South African Constitution provides explicit
interpretive instructions within its own text.222 There is no battle in South
African judicial thought directly analogous to the debate between
conservative originalism and the progressive view of a living, dynamic
constitution as found in the United States; instead, there is explicit
direction.223 For example, Section 39 of the South African Constitution
provides:
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum —
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
b. must consider international law; and
c. may consider foreign law.224
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This Section effectively mandates that South Africa engage with its
constitution in a progressive manner, largely foreign to the American judicial
process of constitutional interpretation.225 This provision has contributed to
the Constitutional Court undertaking “a more communitarian and dignityoriented approach unlike the individualistic and liberty-oriented U.S.
Supreme Court.”226
A second major doctrinal difference in the South African Constitution is
found in Section 36, which provides:
1.

2.

The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in
terms of law of general application to the extent that
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant
factors, including —
a. the nature of the right;
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;
d. the relation between the limitation and its
purpose; and
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.227

The framework articulated in Section 36 of the South African
Constitution is nearly identical to the tripartite analysis advocated for by
Justice Marshall.228 Indeed, the idea of some restriction on fundamental
rights is inherent in any ordered, democratic society. It is intuitive that at
some point individual rights must bow to the common good and protection of
others in society at large. This explicit limitation clause in Section 36 of the
South African Constitution finds several other close analogues in the
numerous constitutional tests that have been developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Again, as with the interpretive instructions of Section 39, the primary
225
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difference in the limiting provision employed by the South African
Constitutional Court is that the necessary judicial calculus regarding the
limitation of fundamental rights is explicitly described in the South African
Constitution.229 Both Sections 36 and 39 of the South African Constitution
are integral to the analysis of criminal disenfranchisement in South Africa,
and to the broader notion of what the United States can learn from that
country’s constitutional process.
B. The Constitutional Court of South Africa
The Constitutional Court is South Africa’s highest court for cases that
involve questions and issues involving the application and interpretation of
the South African Constitution.230 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which
has a broader grant of substantive jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa has jurisdiction only on issues related to the provisions of the
South African Constitution.231
Given the inherently progressive tendencies in the South African
Constitution outlined above, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court
has been noteworthy in its pragmatism and exercise of judicial restraint.232
Reflecting pragmatic concerns over the danger of heavy-handed political
instruction and a want for institutional integrity, the South African
Constitutional Court has often sidestepped some of the most potentially
controversial constitutional issues by limiting the scope of their opinions, at
times in an effort to avoid strictly defining bright lines regarding the outer
limits of free speech and religious expression.233
Although there are differences, both substantively and procedurally,
between the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the U.S. Supreme
Court, there are significant similarities in the judicial process and
authoritative source of law used by both courts that make a comparison
valuable and potentially instructive.
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C. Transformative Constitutionalism
From its earliest stages, the South African Constitution was explicitly
written to be socially transformative.234 It is not just its design but also its
ongoing implementation that is meant to achieve this end.235 Chief Justice
Pius Langa has stated that “[i]t is clear that the notion of transformation has
played and will play a vital role in interpreting the Constitution.”236
Chief Justice Langa has identified the Epilogue of the Interim
Constitution of South Africa as providing perhaps the greatest source for
defining transformative constitutionalism.237 The Epilogue provides that the
South African Constitution serve as a “historic bridge between the past of a
deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights,
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all
South Africans, irrespective of color, race, class, belief or sex.”238 Indeed,
the Chief Justice has stated that the central idea of transformative
constitutionalism is that “we must change,” and that the constitution’s
purpose should be “to heal the wounds of the past and guide us to a better
future.”239
Chief Justice Langa notes that one of the fundamental characteristics of
the new rule of law in South Africa is that the constitution now demands all
decisions “be capable of being substantively defended in terms of the rights
and values [the constitution] enshrines.”240 The importance of this
characteristic is tremendous for a nation previously defined by a dearth of
legislative accountability and a system of law that was often arbitrary,
commonly capricious or, at times, outright evil.241
234
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Notably, this view of transformative constitutionalism is not confined to
the period of transition in South Africa from Apartheid, nor will it be
satisfied when all South Africans enjoy equal rights and access to services
and resources. Chief Justice Langa explains:
Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the
world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation
are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly
explored and created, accepted and rejected and in which
change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant.
This is perhaps the ultimate vision of a transformative, rather
than a transitional constitution. This is a perspective that sees
the Constitution as not transformative because of its peculiar
historical position or its particular socio-economic goals but
because it envisions a society that will always be open to
change and contestation, a society that will always be defined
by transformation.242
The idea of ready adaptation and transformation central to the South
African constitutional construct can be seen throughout the jurisprudence of
the South African Constitutional Court. The case law concerning criminal
disenfranchisement, discussed below, is demonstrative of the ongoing
implementation of this transformative ideal.
D. Criminal Franchise in South Africa: August and NICRO
In both August and NICRO,243 the two landmark Constitutional Court
cases supporting prisoners’ rights to vote, the judicial decision making
process concerned the justification for and legitimacy of government
legislation and action against the positive right of universal suffrage
established in Section 19(3) of the South African Constitution.244 Notably,
these decisions involved a prisoner’s right to vote. No attempt has been
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made by the South African government to disenfranchise individuals no
longer incarcerated.
August was the first of these seminal cases and constituted a relatively
confined judicial decision.245 August did not affirmatively answer the
question of whether it would be constitutional for the legislature to
affirmatively limit a prisoner’s right to vote in a national election.246 NICRO
was decided after the Election Act was amended in the wake of August.247
NICRO ultimately invalidated these amendments, going further than August
and emerging as the stronger doctrinal case.248 Both cases are important in
their own right and this subsection will examine each in turn.
Just prior to the National Parliamentary elections in 1999, a group of
prisoners lobbied the Electoral Commission for an affirmative declaration
that prisoners would be allowed to vote in the upcoming election.249 The
governing piece of legislation, the Electoral Act of 1998, did not expressly
prohibit or limit suffrage for the incarcerated at the time.250 The Electoral
Commission’s policy, however, was not supportive of prisoner voting rights
and took no affirmative action to provide prisoners with the capability to
participate in elections.251 Challengers alleged this policy served to restrict
their right to vote, a fundamental right, and the issue soon came before the
Constitutional Court.252
The Electoral Commission argued to the Constitutional Court that its
inaction alone had done nothing to positively disenfranchise prisoners.253
Further, the Commission argued that it was a situation created by the
prisoners themselves that resulted in the loss of franchise rather than a failure
of an obligation held by the Electoral Commission.254 The Commission
argued it did not have a positive responsibility to seek out registration and
245
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provide ballot access to prisoners; such an imposition of responsibility would
be too costly.255
The Constitutional Court rejected each of the Commission’s arguments.256
The court found that the Electoral Commission had an obligation to citizens
to provide for “the secrecy of the ballot and the machinery established for
managing the [voting] process.”257 The court further held that the Electoral
Commission did not have the statutory or constitutional authority to only
provide a “system of registration and voting which would effectively
disenfranchise all prisoners”; doing so was a violation of the Commission’s
“obligation to take reasonable steps to create the opportunity to enable
eligible prisoners to register and vote.”258 The court also rejected the
government’s pragmatic arguments involving cost, and dismissed the notion
that incarceration alone sufficed as a constitutionally adequate prohibition on
voting.259
In August, the Constitutional Court did not expressly grant franchise to
prisoners or declare an affirmative legislative disenfranchisement of
prisoners unconstitutional, but the tone of the opinion strongly suggested the
future likelihood of a more expansive decision. The court wrote:
The achievement of the franchise has historically been
important both for the acquisition of the rights of full and
effective citizenship by all South Africans regardless of race,
and for the accomplishment of an all-embracing
nationhood . . . The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of
dignity and of personhood. Quite literally, it says that
everybody counts.260
In response to the August decision, the South African Parliament
amended the Electoral Act in 2003.261 The relevant part of the legislation
curtailed the rights of prisoners to vote in two ways. First, the Act stated that
prisoners who were serving a “sentence of imprisonment without the option
of a fine” were prohibited from voting. 262 Second, the Act prohibited
255
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prisoners serving such a sentence from registering to vote while in prison,
thus leaving open the possibility that a prisoner could be released and still
disenfranchised if the voter roll had already been closed.263 In the wake of
August, it was predictable that the constitutionality of these amendments
would soon be challenged.
In Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention
(NICRO), the Constitutional Court duly took up the issue.264 In NICRO, the
government altered its legal argument, and squarely identified the South
African Constitution’s Section 36 limiting provision as providing a
constitutionally legitimate allowance for this legislation.265
The Department of Home Affairs made three primary points in arguing
for the limitation on the right to vote. First, the government made an
argument based on cost: it would be too complicated and expensive to
provide the necessary apparatus for voting in prisons.266 Secondly, the
government drew a comparison between prisoners and other people who may
have difficulty getting to polling stations by arguing it would be inadvisable
and illegitimate to favor prisoners over lawful citizens to the extent that
immediate access to readily available polling stations would be afforded to
prisoners and not all citizens.267 Finally, and apparently most distasteful to
the court, was the government’s argument that it had a legitimate right to
prohibit prisoners from voting so as to denounce crime and uphold the ideals
of lawfulness.268
A majority of the Constitutional Court ultimately disagreed with all of
these arguments and held the relevant law invalid.269 Central to the court’s
decision was an examination of means and ends. The court proceeded
through the government’s arguments in an attempt to prove or disprove a
legitimate connection between the limitation of voting rights and an adequate
government interest.270 Against this backdrop was also the court’s
understanding that “[i]n the light of our history where denial of the right to
vote was used to entrench white supremacy and to marginalise the great
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majority of the people of our country, [the right to vote] is for us a precious
right which must be vigilantly respected and protected.”271
In reaching its decision the court first reiterated its holding in August that
the government has a positive obligation, in any circumstance, to provide its
citizens with the machinery necessary to participate in the voting process.272
For these reasons, the court held that any argument involving cost must be
dismissed, writing “[t]here is nothing to suggest that expanding [voting]
arrangements to include prisoners sentenced without the option of a fine will
in fact place an undue burden on the resources of the Commission.”273 The
government’s argument involving the favoring of prisoners over lawful
citizens was also quickly rejected as illogical.274
The Constitutional Court then reached the more fundamental question of
whether a rational connection existed between voting prohibition for
prisoners and the government’s interest in regulating and preventing crime.
In analyzing this question, the court drew heavily from the Canadian
Supreme Court case Suavé No. 2.275 In Suavé No. 2, the Canadian Supreme
Court held that the government had failed to establish a rational connection
between legislation prohibiting prisoners from voting and the government
interest in regulating unlawful conduct and providing appropriate
punishment.276 The NICRO court endorsed Suavé, quoting its holding that “a
government that restricts the franchise to a select portion of citizens is a
government that weakens its ability to function as the legitimate
representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardises its claims to
representative democracy, and erodes the basis of its right to convict and
punish lawbreakers.”277
Ultimately, the court held that a blanket ban on the right of prisoners to
vote was unconstitutional, and that the government failed to establish
evidence sufficient to show there was an adequate interest in
disenfranchisement.278 In addition, the court found the government’s
arguments regarding public perception of crime and punishment to be
particularly distasteful.279 In response to the notion that allowing prisoners to
271
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vote might result in an appearance of the government being soft on crime,
the court held the government may not “disenfranchise prisoners in order to
enhance its image” or to “correct a public misconception as to its true
attitude to crime and criminals.”280
While not completely closing the door to voting limitations for some
prisoners, NICRO firmly established an exceptionally high bar the
government would have to pass if it wished to restrict access to the ballot.
Thus, the universal suffrage provision of the South African Constitution has
held firm when confronted with attempts to limit the criminal franchise.
IV. ANALYSIS
This Note begins with the premise that a shared history of racial
oppression links the United States and South Africa. In both countries, there
is the shared legacy of racial discrimination being afforded legitimacy and
means for effectuation through legal mechanisms. In both countries, racism
was once rule of law. It is in this harsh light of history that this Note asserts
the United States should follow the South African approach to the
constitutional analysis of criminal disenfranchisement. Ideally, the United
States would guarantee suffrage for nearly all citizens, incarcerated or
otherwise. For now, it would be a significant, and vital, improvement to
restore the right to vote to those currently disenfranchised because of prior
criminal convictions. After exploring the common history of the United
States and South Africa, this Section will propose lessons that may be
learned from the South African notion of transformative constitutionalism.
Additionally, this Section will demonstrate how U.S. federal courts should
address criminal disenfranchisement in the future, both within the current
framework and with an unblinking eye in regard to the shared experience of
racial oppression and the accompanying institutional machinations that
continue to effect citizens in both the United States and South Africa.
A. A Shared History of Racial Discrimination
The institutionalized racism of the recent past is a mark of disgrace on
both the United States and South Africa. Historical error is a difficult issue
to contend with, especially when citizens and politicians still grapple with
that error’s residual effects. This reality can often make thorough and open280
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minded discussion of race difficult, particularly in the United States. For this
reason, it can be useful to consider the experience of other countries,
countries similarly situated but lacking the emotional resonance regarding
similar matters of domestic debate. This Note argues that the United States
and South Africa share enough common history to allow the debate on felon
disenfranchisement in the United States to become more robust by
examining both how and why South Africa has decided issues involving the
voting rights of prisoners.
Among the most glaring images of Apartheid was the physical separation
of races that existed in all aspects of life in South Africa and was positively
mandated by law. Until 1954, such de jure racial segregation was common
throughout much of the United States, particularly in the American South. 281
Beyond mere separation, both countries implemented systems designed to
uphold the oppressive status quo. In the pre-Civil Rights era, state-imposed
voting restrictions effectively disenfranchised large numbers of AfricanAmericans by imposing literacy tests, poll taxes, and moral character tests
that served to prevent African-Americans from accessing the ballot.282 South
Africa similarly employed a number of legislative methods to either limit the
influence of—or outright disenfranchise—the minority electorate.283
Transformative legislation was first passed during the period of democratic
transition in South Africa. After reforming the voting process, in 1994 South
Africa was able to hold open democratic elections for the first time in its
history.284 It was only thirty years prior that the United States had sought to
end racial discrimination in the voting process by passing the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.
Many scholars have written important works on the subject of
institutionalized racism in the United States and South Africa. It is an
important subject, now more than ever. Although the explicit, external shell
of discrimination is gone, the legacy and effect of the errors of the past
continue to exist. Much more should be written about this latter topic,
particularly given its great importance for the ongoing health of a modern
democracy. For the purposes of this Note, it is enough to recognize there is
281

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (declaring the previously lawful
racial segregation of public schools unconstitutional).
282 ALEXANDER, supra note 74, at 187.
283 Grant Farred, Where Does the Rainbow Nation End? Colouredness and Citizenship in
Post-Apartheid South Africa, 1 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 175, 178 (2001), available at http://
muse.jhu.edu/article/50554/pdf.
284 Our Contitution, supra note 212.

446

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 44:401

sufficient similarity between the systems, and legacies, of racial oppression
employed by the United States and South Africa so that a comparative
analysis is useful and instinctive.
B. Transformative Constitutionalism, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the
Weight and Influence of History
In seeking to define transformative constitutionalism, Chief Justice Pius
Langa has stated:
Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the
world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation
are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly
explored and created, accepted and rejected and in which
change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant.285
It is clear why this notion of change was so integral to the South African
experience. The National Party-dominated status quo was deeply entrenched
in South African society for decades. The political elite used this
entrenchment to further dominate and control those populations it chose to
subjugate. It was an unbending and unbroken cycle of oppression. With this
recent history, the ability to have a venue for principled and well-reasoned
debates on legislative and constitutional change continues to be central to
South Africa. This necessity for and protection of change is at the core of
the idea of transformative constitutionalism.
The United States could stand to learn from the sanctity of the notion of
change in South Africa. One of the primary grounds cited by U.S. federal
courts to prevent legal challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws is the
affirmative sanction for some form of these laws found in the Fourteenth
Amendment.286 The Fourteenth Amendment allows the government to
restrict the right to vote for those who “participat[e] in rebellion, or other
crime.”287 This language alone has been used by several federal courts to
uphold the validity of the sprawling, discriminatory patchwork of felon
disenfranchisement laws within the United States.288 There is conflicting
285
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analysis on the importance and relevance of this provision at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was drafted.289 It appears likely that it was
specifically targeted at protecting against rebellious movements within the
former Confederacy, and thus does not stand for the proposition of broad
support for criminal disenfranchisement.290 Further, analysis of the intent of
key drafters and architects of the Fourteenth Amendment provides strong
support for the notion that the drafters would find its current role as an
impediment to challenges of discriminatory criminal disenfranchisement
provisions to be morally and constitutionally repugnant.291
In any event, the example in South Africa suggests that it is inapposite to
rely blindly on the strict language of a constitutional amendment that was
passed in 1868 and has been subject to subsequent revisionist interpretation
by both legislation and judicial decision. It is unlikely that the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment could have foreseen that those six words would
allow the disenfranchisement of over 7% of the African American
population.292
Putting aside the notion of drafting intentions and accepting for argument
that there is a deep history of disenfranchising convicted criminals in the
United States, there is still much to absorb from the South African example
and its approach to history inherent within transformative constitutionalism.
The drafters of the South African Constitution recognized it was necessary to
carefully but authoritatively handle the weight of the past, and to
affirmatively provide for the rights of those previously discriminated against.
Similarly, the United States should not block legal avenues for questioning
the history of racial subjugation or for contesting modern remnants thereof.
These are important questions. Our society, with help if necessary from the
judicial process, needs to have these debates. Although reform of the
criminal justice system may be the larger issue, the disproportionate effect of
felon disenfranchisement on racial minorities should be a major point of
concern for the United States.
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C. A New Vision of Felon Disenfranchisement Reform in the Federal Courts
of the United States
As discussed above, an embracement of the ideals of transformative
constitutionalism, particularly in the realm of legislation that retains the
unavoidable residue of a shameful history, would work significantly to help
change the status quo of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States.
This is not a wholly foreign concept. Although the issue is subject to
persistent and zealous debate, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
consistently indicates their opinion, at least implicitly, of the Constitution as
a document capable of change and growth. The Fourteenth Amendment
needs reassessment, particularly the so-called “affirmative allowance”
regarding criminal disenfranchisement. No law that disenfranchises such a
staggering proportion of the electorate should be considered unimpeachably
constitutionally valid in the United States.
Even if the Fourteenth Amendment restriction is taken at face value, U.S.
federal courts could learn from the more explicit limitation clause analysis
the South African Constitutional Court employs when deciding on issues
involving restrictions of fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court has
held the essential proportionality analysis at the heart of the Section 36
limitation clause is “one of degree to be assessed in the concrete legislative
and social setting of the measure, paying due regard to the means which are
realistically available in our country at this stage, but without losing sight of
the ultimate values to be protected.”293
In the United States, proportionality is not part of the constitutional
equation regarding criminal disenfranchisement. No state government has
yet been forced to provide a detailed factual record of the governmental
interest in, or the purpose of, felon disenfranchisement laws. So far, courts
have held the affirmative sanction of the Fourteenth Amendment alone
provides sufficient constitutional cover.294 Thus, state governments escape
the necessity of engaging in a thorough proportionality analysis regarding
criminal disenfranchisement. This lack of proportionality is unique. No
other restriction on a fundamental right in the United States exists with a
similarly slight explicit rationale. Like all fundamental rights, membership
in civilized society mandates an eventual curtailment of personal liberty.
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The right to vote is such a fundamental right in the United States, and it is no
doubt subject to reasonable restrictions by state governments. Yet, it is not
acceptable that the voting restrictions inherent in felon disenfranchisement
could exist on such impenetrable ground so as to avoid any test of
compelling rationality or narrowly tailored purpose and application.
At present, criminal disenfranchisement in the United States exists as an
outright prohibition of varying duration on a fundamental and deeply
democratic right. Even worse, criminal disenfranchisement laws have an illdefined and arguably nonexistent regulatory purpose. There is little doubt that
any state interest served by felon disenfranchisement provisions could be
achieved in ways that impose significantly less restriction on an individual’s
fundamental right to vote. This quality of American felon disenfranchisement
law would force invalidation under the limitation clause in Section 36 of the
South African Constitution. The law is too broad, the right too important, the
relationship between ends and means too tangential, and the availability of
alternate measure so apparent that the law could not conceivably pass
constitutional muster.
Without adopting the exact provisions of the South African Constitution,
the courts of the United States would be wise to heed its logic. The right to
vote is paramount in a free, democratic society. Any restriction on suffrage
must survive close scrutiny. There is a clear danger in subversion and
distortion of the political process if portions of citizens, and the interests they
represent, are allowed to be roundly disenfranchised. As quoted in NICRO,
the Canadian Supreme Court has written:
A government that restricts the franchise to a select portion of
citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as
the legitimate representative of the excluded citizens,
jeopardizes its claim to representative democracy, and erodes
the basis of its right to convict and punish law-breakers.295
The United States must re-examine the effect and purpose of criminal
disenfranchisement laws. If our country wants to embody the ideal of
democratic legitimacy that we espouse, the current form of felon
disenfranchisement must be recognized as destructive, illegitimate, and
unacceptable.
295 Suavé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para. 34, available at
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V. CONCLUSION
Felon disenfranchisement is exceedingly unique in the United States in
that it is a voting restriction that has steadfastly resisted change in the fifty
years of voting reform promulgated by the legislation and judicial opinions
of the Civil Rights Era. This is particularly exceptional given that felon
disenfranchisement laws harshly and disproportionately affect minority
populations, particularly African-Americans.
While the larger issue of the criminal justice system remains in flux, there
is evidence the pendulum may be shifting in regard to an over-burdened and
out of control system of criminal conviction and incarceration in the United
States. Reform of felon disenfranchisement laws will help speed this shift.
By restricting convicted criminals from voting, state governments are
suppressing the political voice of the very population most affected by the
sky rocketing rates of incarceration of the past thirty-five years. Felon
disenfranchisement has effectively ensured that those most affected by our
current age of mass incarceration have no political voice in the United States.
Further, there is the ever-present and complex element of race in both the
felon disenfranchisement laws of the United States and in the rationale
behind the firm protection of voting rights in South Africa. For numerous
reasons—many relating to unfortunate but enduring vestiges of the American
criminal justice system’s racially discriminatory past—African-Americans
are affected significantly and disproportionately by felon disenfranchisement
laws. This should not be ignored. The United States must reconcile its
tarnished history with its admirable aspirations for the future. Our country
must recognize that even absent intentional discrimination, any law that has
such effect must be questioned. In a country that fifty years ago
disenfranchised black voters by overt machinations of law, the impact and
rationale of felon disenfranchisement must be revisited and more closely
interrogated.

